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This chapter focuses on attempts to link the normative criticisms and prescriptions of 
International Political Theory (IPT) with the critical, empirical, and sociological ambi-
tions of International Relations (IR). Revisiting the cosmopolitan/ communitarian 
debate might seem an unlikely vehicle for such an enterprise. The description of IPT 
that divided normative scholarship into cosmopolitan and communitarian camps drew 
much criticism and, arguably, reinforced the divide between IR and political theory. The 
debate put political theorists into conversation with political theorists on the theme of 
global or international justice, rather than putting political theory in conversation with 
other aspects of IR. Yet reflection upon the twenty- five years since the cosmopolitan/ 
communitarian distinction provided initial focus to the (re)emergence of IPT shows 
that two things stand out. First, despite the many well- founded criticisms of the way 
the cosmopolitan/ communitarian debate conceived of the theoretical debates in IPT, 
and of the ways political theorists conducted those debates, it has proven remarkably 
difficult to escape or transcend the core features of cosmopolitanism and communi-
tarianism in IPT. Attempts to qualify or hyphenate core terms, and to abandon them 
altogether to find new ones, have not really recast the core concerns of IPT. Second, not-
withstanding this first claim, the critical work done in response to the challenges of the 
early debates has left a more mature and refined IPT, one less insistent on drawing sharp 
lines between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (or their various progeny) or 
between IPT and IR. There is still real critical merit in conversations between cosmo-
politans and non- cosmopolitans on matters of meta- ethics and global justice, but some 
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of the most interesting and important work is now happening at the interface between 
IPT and empirical, sociological, and legal studies in IR. It is here, this chapter contends, 
that the contemporary debates between cosmopolitans engaging with the socio- legal 
fabric of international society and new- communitarians engaging with the normative 
implications of evolving transnational and global communities are effecting the nor-
malization of IPT.
Chris Brown’s critique of his own presentation of the cosmopolitan/ communitar-
ian debate captures the peculiar relationship many political theorists have with the 
distinction.
Although these terms will turn up quite frequently in what follows, this distinction 
is not, in fact, a suitable basis for classification. It obscures more than it clarifies; too 
many writers who seem to be in one camp cross over to the other at crucial points. 
There is a real distinction to be made between cosmopolitan and communitarian 
thought, but it cannot be made to bear too much weight— and there is no other clas-
sification that does much better in this respect. (Brown 2002: 17)
While we have learned much from attempts to amend and transcend the terms of the 
debate, there is something fundamental about these broadly drawn categories that 
means they still structure moral reflection on international affairs. Nevertheless, all the 
critical work in response to the limitations of the cosmopolitan/ communitarian debate 
has not been in vain. The second claim this chapter defends is that the cutting edge of 
contemporary cosmopolitan theory and new- communitarian theory (the phrase comes 
from Emmanuel Adler’s 2005 collection) is working to transcend the divisions between 
empirical and sociological (including critical) IR and normative IPT, and in doing so, is 
bringing IPT to bear on the core questions of international law, diplomacy, and public 
policy. Not all IPT has this focus; some forms of cosmopolitan thought in particular 
value the critical distance that abstraction or ideal theory afford the normative theorist. 
But the real potential lies in the emergent debates between cosmopolitans and commu-
nitarians engaged with normative challenges thrown up by the international legal order. 
In general terms the debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians has lessened. 
This is partly because some communitarians have rebranded as weak cosmopolitans, 
but also because the distance between the traditions has widened, with analytic political 
theorists pursuing moral philosophical arguments between themselves and construc-
tivists and historicists pursuing social- theoretic arguments in the pages of a distinct 
literature. But the big ideas that provide the basis for a critical understanding of the nor-
mative still matter, even if the fact that the core division between contemporary cos-
mopolitans and communitarians is not really about the moral equality of humans has 
drawn some of the sting from the early debates. As Risse notes, “we have learned the 
basic cosmopolitan lesson: moral equality is an essential part of any credible theory of 
global justice” (2012: 10; see also Brock and Brighouse 2005: 3). What is key, however, is 
the distinctive ways in which these scholars reason about the normative and particularly 
about the relationship between the moral and political.
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This chapter draws attention to the ways that some cosmopolitan theory and some 
varieties of non- cosmopolitanism, having learned from the critique of the cosmo-
politan/ communitarian distinction and having matured as a sub- discipline, are re- 
engaging with the fundamental institutions of global politics and asking the critical 
and praxeological questions that make ethical enquiry relevant to the world (Linklater 
1998). There is a symmetry here in that IPT, once so keen to push past what Wight once 
pointed to as IR theory— the historical interpretation of law and diplomacy— in a bid to 
assert the centrality of normative enquiry is now returning to these fundamental sites 
of international political practice in order to realize the potential of the field. In order to 
explore these claims, this chapter examines the institutional or practical turn in the work 
of key cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz and Allen Buchanan. Their work shows the 
development of cosmopolitanism from the early critique of the work of scholars such as 
John Rawls and Michael Walzer to the institutionally and legally focused work that ena-
bles them to address, in moral and political terms, vital socio- normative questions from 
secession to environmental or humanitarian protection. Thereafter the chapter explores 
the work of scholars who, despite acknowledging the normative force of universal and 
global moral claims, do not identify with cosmopolitanism as a theoretical tradition. 
This group, which includes scholars such as Christian Reus- Smit and Andrew Hurrell, 
is influenced by English School and constructivist scholarship, and stresses the need 
to consider the normative and sociological context in which norms operate in a highly 
legalized world order.
There is no strong binary division between the political positions of cosmopoli-
tans and communitarians here. It could be argued that there never really was, and that 
focus on the opposition between cosmopolitans and communitarians was a distrac-
tion. Nevertheless, at moments of great political crisis the theoretical approaches that 
underlie normative claims really matter. Even if, as Buchanan has recently argued, “ideal 
theory’s principles can be satisfied or at least seriously approximated through a process 
that begins with the institutions and culture that we now have” (Buchanan and Keohane 
2004: 28), we still need to understand the implications and structure of communitarian 
and cosmopolitan moral arguments in order to make clear and well- reasoned ethical 
judgements.
Part 1
The first claim is not simply an attempt to resurrect the terminology of the cosmo-
politan/ communitarian distinction, but an argument that different terminology still 
references the same broadly drawn but central features of normative debate in IPT. 
Cosmopolitanism certainly has a clearly defined place in the literature. The critical 
response of liberal cosmopolitans to Rawls’s Law of Peoples, and the establishment of 
the then quite radical proposition that moral concern for individuals ought to tran-
scend geopolitical space (particularly the bonds of citizenship) and generational time 
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(see e.g. Pogge 1994; Beitz 2000; Buchanan 2000), established the tradition at the heart 
of contemporary IPT. It is easy, from the vantage point of 2016, to underestimate the 
resistance to the ways in which cosmopolitanism insisted on the existence of universal 
moral principles and the ways in which such principles ought to feed into global polit-
ics. The Rawlsian assumption that IPT should focus on a society of peoples founded on 
a shared history of international law, as developed after the Second World War (Rawls 
1993; 1999), may have put the question of international justice back on the agenda for 
Anglo- American analytic political thought, but it reinforced the statism of the realist 
and pluralist traditions in IR. The trajectory of the work of the early critics of Rawls’s 
work to their current contributions to the debates tells its own story about the rise and 
rise of cosmopolitanism. This is true in two ways. First, the initial work criticized Rawls 
for not seeing the international implications of the moral egalitarianism that was at the 
heart of liberal political theory (e.g. Pogge 1994; Buchanan 2000). The successes of these 
arguments were such that Michael Blake’s claim, “We are all cosmopolitans now,” is 
entirely credible (Blake 2013). Few who fail to identify with cosmopolitan political the-
ory would deny the central tenets of cosmopolitan thought. The commitment to a moral 
conception of the equal worth of human beings and new understandings of the multiple 
ways in which human beings are connected with each other and with future generations 
mean that Pogge’s famous description of the basic elements of cosmopolitanism is now 
applicable to almost all normative IPT (Pogge 2002: 169). Blake argues that this makes 
the term overdue for retirement— it is a frame that did important work when moral 
egalitarianism was disputed but cannot help when the arguments have moved on (Blake 
2013: 52; see also Risse 2012: 17). This point is important but, while bearing in mind the 
earlier injunction to be aware that the categories we employ to simplify our field cannot 
bear too much weight, there are at least two reasons to continue to employ the term as 
part of an attempt to survey the field. First, the term is a key part of the self- description of 
a significant section of the field. Cosmopolitanism is, without doubt, the major tradition 
to emerge from the early debate, and the centrality of cosmopolitanism can blind us to 
its radical and critical nature, which still needs to be defended and elaborated. Secondly, 
it is still important to distinguish between the ways that cosmopolitan IPT thinks about 
moral egalitarianism and the very different ways that non- cosmopolitan traditions do 
so. The cosmopolitan tradition has become much more able to engage with the inher-
ent statism of international law and institutions, and more tolerant of the nuances of 
ethical theories that have a place for the state and the international more broadly. This 
moral confidence has led key scholars including Pogge and, more recently and more 
completely, Buchanan, Beitz, and Risse to focus on the institutional and practical impli-
cations of cosmopolitan and non- cosmopolitan “grounds of justice” (Risse 2012: 16– 17) 
that exist side by side in the global order. The headline here is that the cosmopolitan 
voice can now be heard as a key interlocutor in legal and policy debate. Rather than 
attacking the foundations of an international order that failed to take distributive just-
ice, environmental justice, and human rights seriously as a basis for political action, the 
implications of cosmopolitan ethics on immigration, trade law, secession, environmen-
tal governance, and humanitarian action are now the everyday subjects of cosmopolitan 
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IPT (see Chapters 39 and 40). Such confidence is best expressed, I will argue below, in 
the practical turn in the recent work of Buchanan and Beitz. Here, the question of how 
moral theory can engage with the fragmented and often institutionally compromised 
global legal order is at the centre of debate, and it is an engagement born of confidence 
rather than compromise.
Communitarianism, on the other hand, has had rather different fortunes. The term 
was often used pejoratively to imply a denial of universal or global moral norms, and 
to link non- cosmopolitan scholarship with parochialism and realism. In part, the 
dynamics noted above led early cosmopolitan theorists to overstate the flaws in non- 
cosmopolitan work. Michael Walzer’s work was the clearest example of this phenom-
enon. Walzer’s communitarian position was portrayed as both conservative and statist. 
His critique of the amoralism of realism and his elucidation of universal moral and legal 
rules notwithstanding, Walzer’s argument for limited humanitarian warfare, respect 
(born of solidarity and awareness of the dangers of domination) for cultural difference, 
and respect for the ways in which the state protected the ways of life created by humans 
(Walzer 2006; 1994: 16; 1990: 23) came in for strident criticism. Walzer’s self- description 
of his project as the desire “to take my place among the universalists [ . . . ] to explain the 
appeal of moral particularism” (1990: 509) was barely heard in the early debates. It is tell-
ing that a symposium in Ethics & International Affairs (Beitz 2009; Doyle 2009; Kymlica 
2009) that revisits the debates in Philosophy & Public Affairs between Walzer and his crit-
ics (Beitz 1980; Doppelt 1980; Luban 1980; Walzer 1980) puts much more emphasis on 
the implicit internationalism of Walzer’s work (Beitz 2009: 325). In part this is due to the 
new confidence in cosmopolitan theory in engaging with the centrality of states in law 
and politics. It also has to do with the broader acceptance by those outside the cosmo-
politan tradition of the range of global injustices, and the moral resources at hand to help 
critically approach those injustices. Nevertheless, the early debates effectively neutered 
the viability of the term as it became associated with a conservative agenda in IPT.
The reason this chapter argues for the preservation of the term draws on work in 
another subfield of IR theory. In 2005 Adler published a collection of essays entitled 
Communitarian International Relations in which he develops a constructivist account 
of the “communities of practise” that transform ideas into social practices. In the intro-
ductory essay he makes two moves that point us to a body of scholarship that has the 
potential to be a vital interlocutor with cosmopolitanism in the more practice- oriented 
debates that characterisze some of the most interesting developments in IPT. First, 
Adler contrasts normative and constructivist communitarianism. For Adler, the flaws 
of normative IPT include foundational accounts of the priority of community interests 
over individual interests and the priority of the good over the right. Constructivist com-
munitarianism, or “new communitarianism” as he terms it, is more explicit about the 
role of power in international politics and concerned with constitutive mechanisms of 
community such as “narrative, discourse and practise” that can link theory with practice 
(Adler 2005: 13– 14). He is also clear that the new communitarian account of commu-
nities of practice “cuts across state boundaries and mediate between states, individu-
als and human agency, one one hand, and social structures and systems on the other” 
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(p. 15). His approach has helped link theorists of international society/ community with 
other debates in empirical and sociological IR. While Adler is clear that new commu-
nitarianism has not provided a real engagement with the core normative question that 
has held the attention of IPT— “whether the construction of governance institutions and 
practises should aim, as Hedley Bull argued, at maintaining international order or, as 
Beitz held, at achieving global justice” (p. 13)— more recent work by scholars includ-
ing constructivists such as Richard Price and political theorists such as Reus- Smit has 
addressed this lacuna, bringing communitarianism back into dialogue with IPT on key 
questions of the justice of international practices.
If it were the case that all cosmopolitans were universalist and all communitarians 
statist, the distinction would have been less problematic; but most communitarians 
argue in favour of at least some global moral obligations, and most cosmopolitans rec-
ogniz at least some special obligations among fellow- citizens and/ or between mem-
bers of religious, ethnic, or cultural groups. Yet even taking this into account the debate 
remains focused on “the moral value to be credited to particularistic collectivities as 
against humanity as a whole or the claims of individual human beings” (Brown 1992: 12). 
The main “flaw” that Brown saw in the distinction, that “too many writers who seem to 
be in one camp cross over to the other at crucial points” (p. 17) is not a flaw in the dis-
tinction itself but a flaw in the way scholars viewed cosmopolitanism and communitar-
ianism as mutually exclusive. Moral reasons for valuing human beings as human beings 
and moral reasons for valuing social and political communities are not always theoret-
ically incompatible, but there is something important about the ways in which we assign 
moral priority to the global or the local when making policy recommendations. At issue 
between cosmopolitans and communitarians were the ways in which universal moral 
principles arise and become normative for actors in the world. Communitarians tended 
to draw on more historicist and phenomenological traditions of moral philosophy, and 
it is this that is represented in contemporary or new communitarian thought. As with 
the contemporary cosmopolitans, much of the focus is now on how global moral princi-
ples manifest on the international plane. It is here, in the theoretical and empirical work 
in the social constructivist and English School traditions, that the distinction is and 
remains useful. Replacing the terms with “pluralist” or “solidarist” or with “internation-
alist” or “globalist” does not really change this, and to ignore this central challenge is to 
ignore a core dynamic of IPT.
Even if the terms themselves are at least minimally plausible, much of the criticism of 
the distinction focused on deeper concerns. The cosmopolitan communitarian debate 
was critiqued as being too limited a basis for normative reflection on IR. The purpose of 
the initial presentation of the distinction was to provide an intellectual starting point for 
thinking about questions of international and global justice. In the postwar struggle to 
banish utopianism from the science of IR, moral theory, and the classical canon of pol-
itical theory that was the historical core of normative social and political thought, was 
excised from the discipline either because it was hopelessly idealistic or because it was 
thought to be a fitting subject for (domestic) political rather than international reflec-
tion. The project outlined in International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches 
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(Brown 1992) and in other works such as Janna Thompson’s Justice and World Order: A 
Philosophical Inquiry (1992) or Andrew Linklater’s earlier Men and Citizens in the 
Theory of International Relations (1982), which came out in second edition in 1990 as 
the debate took form, was to re- establish the relevance of political theory (particularly 
in the Western Anglo- American and European traditions) to IR as field of study. The 
initial claim that the history of political thought was also, contra Wight (Wight 1966; see 
Brown 1992: 4– 8; Linklater 1990: 4– 5; Boucher 1998: 8), the classical resource for IPT 
had rather divergent receptions. On the one hand it opened up the field to “a powerful 
and neglected literature” (Smith 1992). On the other, in appealing to the classic Western 
canon it was accused of reinforcing the distinction between empirical and normative 
IR. This latter critique has several relevant variants, all of which focus on the relation 
between politics and ethics. Communitarians, critical theorists, feminists, postcolonial 
theorists and post- structuralists challenged the ways in which IPT treated “ethics as a 
potential ‘doctor’ for IR, a body of principles that can imported from outside, once they 
are finally agreed” (Walker 1993: 50, cited in Brasset and Bulley 2007: 1, emphasis ori-
ginal; see Chapter 42). For these scholars, the problematic philosophical foundations of 
ethics as presented in the classical canon obscured the deeply political nature of moral 
claims in global affairs. There are more or less radical versions of this critique. For the 
post- structuralists, reliance on moral foundations that are “always- already political,” 
and the intellectual certainty that such principles are free of the taint of politics, inevit-
ably “enacts a violence towards alternative possible futures” (Brasset and Bulley 2007: 2), 
and the project becomes a sustained critique of the ways these violences manifest. 
Without embracing the full extent of the critique offered by post- structuralist theorists 
such as Kim Hutchings and Chris Reus- Smit, both express concerns at the ways that 
the cosmopolitan/ communitarian distinction tends to isolate IPT from IR, and thus the 
normative from the empirical.
When IR scholars place normative enquiry in a separate scholarly universe— in the 
realm of political theory or philosophy— they are working with this narrow concep-
tion of what constitutes ethical reasoning. And because students of international eth-
ics have themselves internalized this understanding, they too contribute to the ongoing 
bifurcation of studies of international relations. Profound differences separate stu-
dents of international ethics, fuelling debates between cosmopolitans and communi-
tarians, deontologists and consequentialists, and Kantians, Grotians, and Hobbesians. 
But underneath these differences lies an unstated consensus as to the narrowly defined 
nature of ethical reasoning; and this unstated yet powerful consensus reinforces the div-
ide between scientists and ethicists, but this time from the other direction (Reus- Smit 
2008: 65– 6; Hutchings 1999: 30)
The way IPT often conceives of the normative, its moral foundationalism, its reliance 
on the classical Western canon, pushes all IPT away from the critical and praxeological 
projects of IR. Yet, fuelled by the positive reception of the core idea that morality mat-
ters and that individual moral wellbeing matters whether we are thinking about life in a 
state, a shared transnational context (such as the economy or the environment), or just 
as human moral agents, several pioneering scholars have taken the plunge and sought 
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to open up normative thinking to the political. The watchword of this development is 
“moral accessibilty,” the attempt to gain some critical purchase for ethical reasoning by 
consciously situating ethical reasoning in the political and institutional context of glo-
bal affairs. In this enterprise, scholars in the neo- Kantian liberal tradition often associ-
ated with cosmopolitanism and scholars in more historicist traditions are moving from 
different directions towards a similar goal— morally accessible, institutionalized moral 
reasoning.
Part 2
Cosmopolitans and communitarians have different reasons for seeking moral accessi-
bility. For the latter, doubts about the fact/ value distinction and a critical or interpretive 
concern for the ways that politics informs ethics pushes theorists to consider the ways 
that moral reasons manifest in social and political contexts (Hurrell 2002: 139– 42). For 
the former, a recognition that global institutions embody at least some universal princi-
ples designed to promote the equal moral worth of all humans has prompted an engage-
ment with the institutional and brought with it a sense that such an engagement changes 
the nature of the theoretical enterprise. These intellectual patterns once again bring cos-
mopolitans and communitarians into debate— this time over what institutional moral 
reasoning is and what moral prescriptions flow from it. The key claim here is that once 
again we are finding fruitful ground for a renewed debate between the two camps, and 
one that is of significance to an intellectual constituency beyond political theory.
It is unsurprising that communitarianism might find an ally in constructivist IR the-
ory. A focus on the creation and evolution of communities that create meaning, and 
on the co- constitutive ways in which ideas, norms, and institutions develop, is the nat-
ural extension of the tradition. Indeed, the broad historical claims about the evolution 
of international society and the ways that communities mediate morality found in the 
work of communitarians, the English School, and in that of constitutive theorists such 
as Mervyn Frost gains much from the empirical and sociological research programmes 
of the constructivist approach. Richard Price notes that “much constructivist work was 
itself a response to scepticism that moral norms matter in world politics” (Price 2008: 3). 
But an understanding of the relationship between the empirical revelation that moral 
norms do matter and the question that critical and normative political theorists want 
to ask is a vital project still under development. The new communitarians (and here the 
description casts off the imprimatur of Adler) pursue moral accessibility through
locating stable, public and shared vocabularies of justice that can serve as a medium 
for argumentative exchange across the world as a whole and not simply within the 
confines of the Western world, or the still more limited confines of liberal political 
theory [ . . . ] the core focus, then, should be on the idea of a moral community, not 
as posited, or imagined, or argued for by human reason alone, but as reflected in the 
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shared practises, shared understandings and broader moral consciousness of inter-
national and global society. (Hurrell 2007: 303)
We need to bear in mind that what we are seeking access to is a site of moral debate. It is 
not possible to read off the answer to the question “What ought we to do in context x?” 
by simply describing context x. Nor can communitarians avail themselves of the empir-
ical findings of the constructivists and then simply apply existing moral theories found 
in IPT. As Price argues, “normative theory and ethical prescriptions cannot completely 
eschew their own empirical assumptions even as they rarely develop them as thoroughly 
as has constructivism” (Price 2008: 7). At the same time, empirical accounts of the nor-
mative cannot and ought not to eschew normative theorizing. The praxeological ques-
tion that animates this work is simply “How should we act?” and, as Reus- Smit argues, 
this question necessarily brings empirical inquiry into dialogue with normative theory.
Pure empirical analysis or positive theory can never, in and of itself, tell us how we 
should act, as it can never tell us our purposes. And purely normative, philosoph-
ical enquiry can tell us nothing about the parameters of action, about the constraints 
and opportunities provided by the context— material and non- material— in which 
we seek to act. The purely empirical is as mythological and naive as the purely philo-
sophical. (Reus- Smit 2008: 57)
The key challenge of this new communitarianism is to elaborate the relationship 
between the empirical and the normative, and to show how that helps us answer the 
praxeological question. One example of how this might be done can be seen in Reus- 
Smit’s argument about the “interstitial” structure or “holistic” nature of ethical rea-
soning, and how practices discipline normative arguments (Reus- Smit 2004:  24– 38; 
2008: 74– 9).
Cosmopolitans, by contrast, appear to have less natural affinity with practice- based 
approaches to normative reasoning. Yet much early work recognized the important 
ways in which the development of (for example) human rights institutions provides the 
basis for individualized moral claim rights that serve to restrict the rights of states in 
their dealings with those in their jurisdiction and, more tentatively, generate obligations 
to those whose state cannot provide appropriate fulfilment of those rights. This enabled 
some scholars to pursue a cosmopolitan agenda on the basis of an apparent consensus 
already reached in practise. Thomas Pogge’s unpacking of the moral and practical con-
sequences of taking article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
seriously provides a powerful case (Pogge 2002; 2007). In this case the institutional 
implications of the UDHR stood in as little more than a proxy for the moral argument 
that underpinned Pogge’s cosmopolitanism. More recently, however, Buchanan and 
Beitz have gone much further, seeking to engage more completely with practices. In 
doing so they recognize both the advantages and compromises entailed in such an enter-
prise (Buchanan 2004; 2010; Beitz 2010). The practical turn in liberal IPT (if indeed it is 
developed enough to be so called) recognizes that if we are to take practices seriously we 
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have to permit the practice some authority in the argument we present. Institutions mat-
ter. Norms require institutionalization in order to be effective and so, at the very least, 
we need to be cognizant of the effects institutionalization will have. Equally importantly, 
we must realise that it is the practices themselves, rather than philosophical arguments 
about practices, that are normative for actors.
Buchanan’s recent work develops arguments about the vital role of institutional moral 
reasoning in IPT. Studying the practices of international human rights law (or, in the 
earlier work, of international law more generally) is to study the “universally access-
ible authoritative version of the global lingua franca” (Buchanan 2013: 7). Studying these 
institutionalized practises and ideas also enables us to focus on the question of the feasi-
bility (in practical and moral terms) of getting from where we are to where we want 
to go (Buchanan 2004: 18– 22). Buchanan makes clear that “international legal human 
rights are not the legal embodiment of a subset of moral human rights. Rather, they are 
what they are: legal rights; and legal rights need not be the embodiment of corresponding 
moral rights. Nor need legal rights be justified by appealing to moral rights. Legal rights, 
as instrumental human creations, can serve a number of different purposes and can be 
justified by appeal to a number of different kinds of moral considerations” (Buchanan 
2013: 11, emphasis original). In the earlier work he describes his project as developing 
a moral theory of international law. The practice has rules that make the lingua franca 
intelligible to and legitimate in the eyes of actors. Buchanan, drawing on Samantha 
Besson, argues that the law
is an institutionalized form of practical reasoning that serves moral values while at 
the same time managing moral disagreement by constraining the types of reasons 
and evidence it admits as relevant. (Buchanan 2013: 8)
Buchanan is not renouncing his moral philosophy (which he describes a natural “duty 
of justice” argument) but, in turning to practices, he is limiting its role in the recog-
nition that “institutionalized public normative reasoning plays an ineliminable role” 
(Buchanan and Keohane 2004: 5– 6). Beitz pushes in the same direction. His practical 
approach “aims to exploit the observation that the human rights enterprise is a global 
practise” (Beitz 2010: 8). In doing so, he argues that as political theorists we are obliged 
to allow the practice some authority in our thinking.
the practise exists: it is elaborate both doctrinally and politically, it consumes a con-
siderable amount of human and other resources, and people tend to regard its norms 
with great seriousness. If the focus of critical interest is the idea of human rights as it 
exists in public reflection and argument about global political life, then it seems self- 
evident that we should take instruction from public practise in conceptualizing its 
central terms. (Beitz 2010: 11)
Both scholars are intent on exploring the justice of the existing normative order. They 
clearly have some normative commitments that we would describe as cosmopolitan, but 
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they are subjecting them to the authority of the practice in order to gain access to the 
global lingua franca. It is here that we can see the re- emergence of a more mature, insti-
tutionally nuanced debate.
Conclusion
The potential to bring moral debate to the centre of debates about institutions, legal 
reform, and power by opening IPT to conversation with other scholarly traditions in IR 
and beyond is immense. Here the strengths of critical and sociological IR theory, of legal 
scholarship, and of IPT re- engage in a conversation that situates ethical reflection as a 
part of politics rather than as something outside it. The cosmopolitan communitarian 
debate on the relationship between ethics and politics, the normative, and the empir-
ical is a significant part of this development, but the whole thrust of the practical turn 
is the recognition that moral theory alone does not have the answers to our real- world 
dilemmas. It is worth remembering that the cosmopolitan/ communitarian distinction 
was intended as a textbook introduction to ethical issues in IR, and it is a distinction 
that most textbooks have struggled to transcend. Good textbooks capture the essence of 
disciplinary evolution, speaking both to what is happening in the best scholarship and 
to what the next stage of scholarly debate should be. The volumes that established and 
developed the cosmopolitan/ communitarian distinction did just that, and provoked 
important work by scholars in IPT. Whether IPT sustains or abandons the terminology, 
it is clear that the core ideas are still relevant, and that opening out that conversation 
to learn from other traditions of scholarship is vital. It is significant then that Anthony 
Lang’s recent introduction to IPT finds four stands of IPT in political theory— IR theory, 
international legal theory, and moral and ethical philosophy— noting that while most 
scholars in these strands do not see themselves as contributing to IPT, we should ignore 
sub- disciplinary boundaries and work with all who engage with issues of normativity at 
the international level (Lang 2015: 8). This thought will influence the scholarship of stu-
dents who read the book, and who are taught that IPT is a vital part of IR more broadly, 
and of scholars in empirical, legal, and philosophical disciplines for whom the subject 
matter of IR— the question what ought we to do in the face of global challenges— is more 
important than intellectual boundaries.
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